Next on the impact of expense investments on Amazon's earnings, we consider this...
C. Content to encourage more customer loyalty via Amazon Prime membership.
I joined Amazon Prime last month for $79 a year. I promptly dropped my Netflix membership in favor of Prime streaming videos, found a book I wanted to "check out" for free on my Kindle this month, and went looking for items I could put on "subscribe and save" status. Oh yes, I've ordered several more things this month than I ordinarily would as a test to see how extensively I could use Amazon Prime as a replacement for my family's weekly (or more) trips to Target and to revel in the close-enough-to-instant gratification provided by its two-day shipping at no additional cost.
We're hooked, and I have no doubt we'll spend a lot more money at Amazon as a result...which will translate into less money at Target and even fewer reasons to visit other web retailers at all.
Growth At Too High a Cost?
A site called firstadopter.com singled out Amazon last month as its "secular short of 2012." It makes a reasonable comparison to dot.com bubble company Kozmo when considering the cost of cheap delivery:
Back in the dot.com bubble there was a company called Kozmo.com that offered free 1 hour shipping of array of small goods like books, videos, magazines, etc. To my amazement, I tried the service and ordered a pack of gum. Within an hour someone was at my door to deliver it. The company reported amazing revenue growth. Obviously investors should have discounted that sales growth as it was an “uneconomic” business model.
Amazon is doing a similar thing by subsidizing free shipping. Anecdotally I am hearing customers who have Amazon Prime feel compelled to order small items to take advantage of the free 2-day shipping benefit. They are ordering batteries, Listerine, toilet paper, water bottles, etc. all with free 2-day shipping, which is goosing Amazon’s revenue without helping their bottom line.
If you sell $1.00 of value for 99c, you will show amazing revenue growth. It’s all fine and dandy until your free shipping offering hits critical mass with take-up accelerating and the losses start ballooning.
The author makes good points, and it's hard to disagree that Amazon shouldn't put itself on a slippery slope of economic destruction via cheap delivery. We must, of course, consider Amazon's rationale for embarking on this program and its capacity to continue it without overwhelming the business economics.
First, the Prime program is several years old at this point. If I recall correctly, it started at $99/year before Amazon started dropping the price (as it has a habit of doing). Management has had time to review the data and look at its impact on the business. Unless we have reason to believe that Bezos et al. are irrational or such brinks-men that they would double-down on a value-destroying initiative, I think it's fair to give them the benefit of the doubt and assume they're seeing some positive things coming from the effort.
In 2008 Bezos did this interview with Businessweek in which he commented on the benefit of being big when you want to try innovative things:
One of the nice things now is that we have enough scale that we can do quite large experiments without it having significant impact on our short-term financials. Over the last three years the company has done very well financially at the same time we've been investing in Kindle and Web services - and all that was sort of beneath the covers.
Remember, Prime is part of a marketing tactic for Amazon that presumably fits within the context of a much larger strategy. Inexpensive (or free) shipping is not a business model for them as it was for Kozmo.com.
Second, I'm reminded of a story from Built From Scratch, the autobiographical book from Home Depot's founders. Early in the company's history they began offering no-question refunds to their customers. Anyone could bring in any item purchased from Home Depot and get a full refund without any flack from the store. It should be no surprise that this practice invited abuse and fraud which really irked some employees. They couldn't stand the idea of being fleeced by freeloaders and fraudsters. When they complained to Bernie Marcus and Arthur Blank, the founders told them to suck it up. Despite the handful of jerks eager to take advantage of them, the lenient returns policy was driving more business to their stores and away from competitors who would wrestle with customers over each return. In context of the big picture, the losses were tiny compared to the gains from all the additional business.
The Amazon Prime Impact
- Increasing Order Activity: His annual number of orders was up 7x and dollar spend up 500 percent.
- Declining Order Size: His cost per order dropped from $70 to $54.
- Gross Profit Benefit: Overall gross profit dollars to Amazon were up though percentage margin was down.
- Loss Leaders: 33 percent of his orders lost money for Amazon.
The key points are that he increased his orders and dollar spend with Amazon, AND while its margins were lower, Amazon likely netted higher overall gross profit dollars from Schachter using Prime membership so extensively. He says his margin percent dropped from 25 to 18 but because he did so much more volume, the overall gross profit generated went from $322 before he joined Prime to $816 in 2011.
It's critical to understand that absolute gross margin dollars generated by sales trumps the gross profit percentage in Amazon's business model. Why? I wrote this last year when evaluating Overstock.com (here):
I go so far as saying that I don’t necessarily care what a company’s gross margin percent is. I want to see the dollar amount covering the expenses. After expenses are paid for, I’m all for selling more product or service at any gross margin percent as long as that doesn’t hurt the franchise, the business’s long-term prospects, or increase expenses. Why? After your expenses are paid for, each additional $1 of gross profit drops straight to the earnings box regardless of whether you sold it at 20% or 1% margin. Percentages be damned! That’s cold, hard cash.
I considered myself an Amazon consumer fan for years, and yet I didn't join Prime. As Amazon expanded the Prime experience, however, it became a no brainer to do it. (Indeed, it paid for itself twice over when I canceled my Netflix subscription.)
Amazon is creating another virtuous cycle by plowing hundreds of millions into content for Prime members. But it's not going to show short-term earnings benefits. Over the long haul, however, I expect my experience will mirror the overall increased adoption rate. At some point the value becomes so high, many more Amazon customers will do it because it's just dumb not to.
Amazon found my tipping point, and now I'm a Prime member who spends more money with them and has even paid to rent a few videos for my daughter to enjoy on the Kindle Fire during long car rides (something I would not have done if i weren't already enjoying the "free" streaming videos courtesy of Prime).
Moreover, I've canceled my Netflix subscription and am actively looking for more ways to spend my shopping dollars with Amazon instead of making trips to Target.
Conclusion: If Amazon is not locking itself into a Kozmo.com uneconomic business model and is, as Schachter's self-analysis suggests, building in higher overall gross dollars to cover its expense nut...AND...it's building customer habits and loyalty...AND...it's taking business away competitors. Well, i think this counts as an offensive move.
This post was originally published here on Adjacent Progression.